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Calf marketing, commercial beef carcass, and natural/implant-free beef strategic
alliances were examined via case study to determine alliance structure and whether
each addressed risk, transaction costs, capital availability, and other concerns. All
alliances were structured differently through vertical or horizontal coordination,
and each had been established within the past 12 years. Alliance administrators
reported that an advantage to cow-calf producers was higher cattle prices received
relative to producers outside the alliances. The alliances reduced transaction costs
and increased information flow among segments. Alliances did not specifically
address risk or increased access to capital for technology adoption or expansion
purposes.
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The U.S. beef industry has traditionally produced a product that could more accur-
ately be described as a commodity than a branded, differentiated product. This
situation is slowly changing, though branded beef products remain limited because
of coordination challenges, lack of product differentiation, and resistance by some
retailers (Schroeder and Kovanda, 2003). The industry continues to face additional
concerns, including continued consumer misgivings associated with the healthful-
ness of beef, industry segmentation, and a relatively slow rate of technology adop-
tion among cattle producers (Gillespie et al., 2000). Greater vertical and horizontal
coordination in the industry could help to address some of these concerns.
One way in which coordination has increased in the beef industry is through
strategic alliances. Among a number of definitions, Sporleder (1994, p. 533) defines
strategic alliances as “purposive strategic relationships between independent firms
that share compatible goals, strive for mutual benefits, and acknowledge a high level
of mutual dependence.”
Strategic alliances have been formed in the beef industry to coordinate activities
among producers, as well as among other industry segments. No “typical” strategic
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1  To illustrate the diversity of beef strategic alliances in the industry, the reader is referred to the “Alliance Yellow
Pages,” found on the Beef magazine website, http://beef-mag.com/mag/2004-alliance/.
alliance structure exists in the beef industry. Most involve cattle producers devising
strategies through which they can collectively market cattle to the downstream
segment (feedlot or packer, depending upon the alliance) at higher prices than they
could receive outside the alliance.
In some cases, alliances coordinate more than two segments by (a) vertically
coordinating, linking up- and downstream firms into a single decision entity;
(b) vertically integrating, linking up- and downstream firms into a single firm; or
(c) horizontally coordinating or integrating, analogs to (a) and (b) respectively,
except among entities at the same level.
1 Two studies that have addressed strategic
alliances specifically in the beef industry include Schroeder and Kovanda (2003),
who discussed the motivations and prospects for strategic alliances, and Tronstad
and Unterschultz (2005), who examined strategies of firms throughout the beef
supply chain and assessed how coordination improved the ability to react to
changing consumer tastes and preferences.
Various studies have described different classifications of strategic alliances (e.g.,
Sartwelle et al., 2000; Schroeder and Kovanda, 2003; and Yelich, 1997). Yelich
identified four types of strategic alliances in the beef industry: (a) breed-associated,
(b) commercial beef carcass, (c) natural/implant-free, and (d) vertically integrated
cooperatives. We would add a fifth alliance type: calf marketing alliances. These five
alliance types are described below (where the first four are developed from Yelich).
# First, breed-associated alliances are generally “endorsed by specific breed associa-
tions,” typically specify breed, handle source-verified products, provide carcass
feedback to producers, and “market high-quality beef products” (Yelich, p. 45).
# Second, commercial beef carcass alliances “promote relationships among industry
segments.” They provide performance feedback from the feedlot to the producer,
“carcass information from the packing plant back to the cow-calf producer”
(Yelich, p. 46), and prices that more accurately reflect the value of cattle.
# Third, natural/implant-free alliances produce and “market antibiotic and growth
promotant-free products” (Yelich, p. 46). The method used to raise the animal is
generally of greatest importance to these alliances. Most provide feedlot and
carcass data to producers.
# Fourth, vertically integrated alliances are generally region-based, and often involve
producer-owned cooperatives that are integrated forward from cattle producers to
downstream firms. “Their primary goal is full control of the product they produce,
while returning profits back to the members” (Yelich, p. 46).
# Finally, calf marketing alliances, our suggested fifth classification, generally involve
cow-calf producers commingling their animals, thus increasing market volumes and
prices. These alliances vary in calf production requirements.Gillespie et al. Strategic Alliances in U.S. Beef Production   199
The overall objective of this study is to compare and contrast six strategic alli-
ances in the beef industry. Specifically, we consider strategic alliances whose
structures could be especially useful to Southeastern U.S. cow-calf producers,
identify differences in the organizations, and compare and contrast them with respect
to risk, transaction costs, capital acquisition, information flow, and type of coordin-
ation among firms. This study expands the literature on beef strategic alliances by
providing relatively detailed information on six models of strategic alliances,
illustrating the theoretical and empirical motivations for their structures and the
diversity of structures that currently exist in the industry.
The Economic Environment Currently Faced 
by the Beef Industry
Since the late 1970s, the beef industry has lost substantial market share to poultry.
In 1985, per capita consumption of beef, pork, and chicken (retail boneless, trimmed
weight) was 74.6, 47.7, and 36.1 pounds, respectively; by 2003, the corresponding
figures were 62, 48.5, and 57.5 pounds (USDA/National Agricultural Statistics
Service, 2004). The reduction in beef consumption relative to poultry is generally
attributed to health concerns that arose with respect to beef in the 1970s, continued
reductions in poultry prices, and poultry’s increased responsiveness to consumer
tastes and preferences through new, differentiated products. Lower poultry prices
have evolved due to increased production efficiency and reduced marketing costs
via vertical integration.
Given industry differences, the poultry and similarly evolving pork industry
models are unlikely to fit the beef industry, though increased coordination could
contribute to a more efficient industry (Gillespie et al., 2000). The beef industry, on
the other hand, might evolve into a structure which increases marketing, production,
and pricing efficiency while recognizing that this forage-based species will continue
to be raised in less-controlled environments (outdoors), under highly varied environ-
mental (climatic) conditions, and likely with lower investment in product-specific
fixed assets relative to its competitor meat industries. Ward (2004) provides further
discussion of the challenges faced by the beef industry in achieving increased
coordination.
Strategic alliances may help the beef industry to become more competitive. To
provide products that consistently meet consumer tastes and preferences, packers
need to obtain uniform quality live inputs. To ensure procurement of these animals,
they must improve communication with feedlots and pay prices based on desired
specifications. With premium prices being paid for quality fed animals, feedlots
could pay premium prices for top quality calves, thereby benefiting the producer
(Gillespie and Schupp, 2000).
Benefits of strategic alliances to cow-calf producers may include linkages with
the processing segment, new calf market outlets, higher calf prices, and greater
access to information that would help them make profit-maximizing decisions. Some200   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
existing alliances require specific management practices, including health programs,
feeding programs, use of particular feedlots and/or packers, quality assurance pro-
grams, growth implant programs, and antibiotic use restrictions (Ward and Estrada,
2000).
Other considerations that may be associated with vertical or horizontal coordin-
ation generally include the following. First, risk reduction (in the sense of price or
production risk) may result from certain forms of coordination. Reimund, Martin,
and Moore (1981) discuss the evolution of contracting as resulting from increased
risk. Martin (1997) shows that contracts in the hog industry result in risk shifting to
the contractor.
Second, transaction cost reduction may result from coordination, as argued by
Williamson (1979). Transaction costs are incurred in establishing the rules and
carrying out a market transaction. In his seminal 1937 work, “The Nature of the
Firm,” Coase introduced original insights into the existence of transaction costs and
their effects. Williamson (1979) addressed transaction characteristics influencing
governance structure. If transaction frequency were either occasional or nonrecur-
rent, and little specific investment were required for the transaction, then market
governance would be expected. Alternatively, if recurrent transactions and a mixed
investment (both nonspecific and idiosyncratic) existed, then bilateral governance
relational contracts would result. In the cow-calf segment, it can be argued that both
exist. Less typical, however, are frequent transactions with an idiosyncratic invest-
ment, which would result in unified governance, or vertical integration. Hobbs (1997)
identifies information, negotiation, and monitoring costs as important transaction
costs in the beef industry that may be reduced via alternative marketing strategies.
Gillespie et al. (2000) provide an extensive discussion of transaction costs and their
impact on livestock and, specifically, beef industry structure.
A third result of coordination may be reduced capital requirements or increased
access to capital for enterprise expansion. Barry, Sonka, and Lajili (1992) discuss
this notion with respect to contracting. Fourth, reduced autonomy, or reduced control
over firm decisions, may be a consequence of coordination. Gillespie and Eidman
(1998) examine the impact of autonomy on the selection of business arrangements
in the pork industry. The level of autonomy retained by alliance cow-calf producers
varies by alliance, from almost complete control of management decisions to greater
control by another segment. These four characteristics, as well as others discussed
earlier, form the basis for comparing and contrasting strategic alliances in this
article.
Methods
Case study analyses of six selected strategic alliances were conducted. Case studies
are particularly useful when there are relatively few entities to be examined,
disallowing statistical inference. A number of publications in the agricultural
economics and agribusiness literature over the past 15 years have provided guide-
lines for case study design and have discussed the value of case studies (e.g., Lyford,Gillespie et al. Strategic Alliances in U.S. Beef Production   201
Beierlein, and Harling, 2000; Kennedy and Luzar, 1999; Sterns, Schweikhardt,
and Peterson, 1998; Howard and MacMillan, 1991). For the present study, a
multiple case study design using both descriptive and exploratory techniques was
adopted (Yin, 1994). Personal interviews were used to collect data on each
strategic alliance. Questions addressed in the interviews focused on the alliance’s
production, economic, performance, and marketing characteristics. Following
recommendations by Yin (1994), a case study database was developed to ensure
data reliability.
The strategic alliances interviewed for this study were chosen based on their
location in the Southeastern United States or Southern Plains and their acceptance
of Brahman genetics. The six alliances consist of two commercial beef carcass
alliances, denoted Carcass A and Carcass B; a natural/implant-free alliance, desig-
nated by Natural; and three calf marketing alliances, identified as Calf A, Calf B,
and Calf C—all located in the Southeastern United States.
A questionnaire was designed to address specific aspects of each alliance, in-
cluding but not limited to the following: transaction costs, price variability, access
to capital, information transfer, and availability of alternative markets for animals
of specific characteristics. As suggested by Yin (1994), research questions were
generally open-ended, thereby ensuring respondents provided interviewers with
the detailed information needed for the study. Personal interviews took place with
administrators of each strategic alliance during Fall 2003. Interviews were con-
ducted at each strategic alliance headquarters by administering the questionnaire,
tape recording the interviews, and taking notes. A consent form, signed by each
administrator, explained the purpose of the survey, the possibility of publication
of results of the interview, and the lack of confidentiality associated with the
study.
After conducting each interview, information was compiled and written as a
transcript. Post-interview communication with the strategic alliance administrators
was established to clarify any questions. Administrators then read their respective
transcripts in Winter 2004, and informed the authors if misinterpretations had
occurred in translation from interview to transcript. The resulting case study
database, as noted by Yin (1994), is thus ensured to have a high level of credibility.
The narrative below provides details of the information collected from the inter-
views.
Descriptions of Strategic Alliances
Structures of each of the six alliances are shown in figure 1, which provides flow
charts illustrating the market relationships among segments and cow-calf producers
in each alliance. These charts identify linkages among entities as vertical integration,
vertical coordination, horizontal integration, horizontal coordination, and spot mar-
ket. Information on selected comparison criteria is given in table 1. (Greater detail
may be found in Bu, 2004.)202   Fall 2006 Journal of AgribusinessGillespie et al. Strategic Alliances in U.S. Beef Production   203204   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 1. Principal Criteria for Comparison of Six Strategic Alliances
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Head of cattle sold via
alliance
2,500 over 5 years 13,000 over 2¼ years 1,975 in previous year
(extended . . . ÷) 
Calf Marketing Alliance #1 (Calf A)
The Calf A alliance was formed in 1999, with 23 cow-calf producers. It enables
producers to pool calves with those of other producers, thus horizontally coordi-
nating (as illustrated in figure 1) in order to sell in truckload lots to buyers. Cattle
are reportedly sold at higher prices and transaction costs are reduced relative to
marketing individually via conventional auction. The Calf A alliance has utilized
both video auction and private-treaty sales.
Producers use Angus bulls that are purchased together to increase calf uniformity.
A coordinator decides which bulls are to be purchased, though all members pur-
chasing bulls are present and, if one objects to a certain bull, it is deleted from the
order list. Bull numbers are then randomly drawn by all members, with each producer
paying the actual price of the drawn bull. Using this method, producers purchaseGillespie et al. Strategic Alliances in U.S. Beef Production   205
Table 1. Extended
ALLIANCE






Record keeping None BQA
Transportation costs of







Bulk input purchase? No No No

























150 1,300 to 1,400 225
Head of cattle sold via
alliance
Not available 100,000 in previous
year
60,000 annually
uniform bulls that have been approved by all members. The alliance generally
advertises calves as ½ Angus and ¼ Brahman.
Over 700 cows are dedicated to the Calf A alliance. As of Fall 2003, approxi-
mately 2,500 head had been sold over the previous five years. Producers raise calves
to 400S750 lbs., to be shipped in August. The alliance has five contracts for different
weights, so any calf fits into a load. The June calf weight determines the load in
which it will fit when shipped in August.
A required three-month breeding season (March 15SJune 15) has allowed the
alliance to improve marketing, due to market indicators on specific selling months
and synchronization. Production practices required of all alliance members include
specifications for vaccination, castration, implants, worming, and dehorning. Work-
shops are held by the alliance, where producers learn how to “work” calves.
Enforcement of practices is by internal, informal policing rather than assigning
one individual to serve as a “policeman.” Within subgroups of seven to eight, all206   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
producers take responsibility, since all are present for working subgroup calves. The
alliance has adopted a tagging system for improving calf handling and record
keeping. The alliance takes advantage of beef extension education programs offered
by a land grant university in the state where the alliance is located.
Given reduced dependence on conventional auctions, producers have lowered the
following transaction costs at time of sale: commission, shrinkage, transportation
costs, insurance costs, and other auction-specific expenses. Transportation cost is
paid by the buyer.
Using both video auction and private-treaty marketing, producers solicit offers
from buyers. The sale is via contract. Alliance members have purchased inputs in
bulk, including veterinary supplies, ryegrass seed, baler twine, and others, allowing
members to secure inputs at lower prices. Members are not required, however, to
purchase inputs through the alliance.
The Calf A alliance consists of a chairman, treasurer, and purchasing agent, all
members. Because there are no alliance employees, no salary expense is incurred.
Members meet bimonthly, and major decisions are made in a democratic manner
(majority rule). Information is passed among alliance members via working together
and through planned educational programs. For a producer to join the alliance, at
least 10 cows must be designated. An initial membership fee of $50 helps to cover
operational expenses. The program has successfully led to increased use of desired
management practices, resulting in higher quality animals that reportedly command
higher prices.
Calf Marketing Alliance #2 (Calf B)
The Calf B alliance was formed by a statewide retail farm input supply cooperative
and the livestock division of the state’s chapter of the Farm Bureau. The farm supply
cooperative coordinates many of the activities of the alliance. Other alliance
members include four animal health input firms and a private creditor. The alliance
also uses resources from the state’s Department of Agriculture, its chapter of the
Cattlemen’s Association, and one of its land grant universities.
Through the alliance, cow-calf producers precondition calves over a 45-day, post-
weaning period, and sell through the Calf B program. Cow-calf producers horizon-
tally coordinate by agreeing to production parameters, and vertically coordinate with
the input supply cooperative and buyers via conventional auction (see figure 1).
The Calf B alliance was formed in 2001, using existing cooperative employees.
The marketing coordinator, an employee of the cooperative, has the greatest
responsibility for operations. There are 120 cooperative retail stores across the state
that purchase inputs in bulk. At each store, there are at least two employees from
whom producers may obtain alliance information.
A benefit to the approximately 350 producers selling through the program is the
ability to group truckloads of preconditioned calves for sale. Pooling quality calves
reportedly yields higher prices than would be received by selling individually.
On a typical sale day, 40 to 50 producers transport alliance cattle to a conventionalGillespie et al. Strategic Alliances in U.S. Beef Production   207
auction. Stockyard personnel group them into uniform weights to yield as many
48,000- to 50,000-pound loads as can be presented for sale. The alliance is funded
with resources from the involved agencies, firms, and organizations. Funds also
come from a per head marketing fee, paid by each producer.
Primary production requirements are divided into strict animal health and feeding
programs. The health program involves specific vaccinations, retention of calves on
the farm at least 45 days after weaning, use of Beef Quality Assurance (BQA) pro-
cedures, and certification of producers or administering veterinarians, as well as
other requirements involving but not limited to procedures such as deworming,
dehorning, and those specific to heifers and bull calves. For the feeding program,
animals must be “bunk broken” and fed specified cooperative feeds for at least 45
days. Producers must choose one of four specified health programs for the 45-day
program. Animal health records are required of producers, on which products
applied, expiration dates, and method of administration must be recorded. These
records accompany the cattle when marketed.
Handling any animal produced within its guidelines, the Calf B alliance has
reportedly built a reputation among feedlots for better performing cattle, thereby
increasing market opportunities. Field staff members help producers by answering
questions or recommending strategies. Annual numbers of animals handled through
the alliance since formation are as follows: year 1 = eight sales of over 1,500 total
head; year 2 = 12 sales of nearly 7,700 total head; and year 3 (1st quarter) = 11 sales
of 3,900 total head. The alliance encourages no more than a 60- to 90-day calving
season. Alliance sales are focused in the Fall, but there are also sales in February.
Special sales are scheduled at markets for Calf B alliance cattle, though some
private-treaty sales may also be made.
Marketing agencies with whom the alliance works charge standard commission
fees to producers (the fees at the conventional auctions through which the animals
are sold); thus, commission costs are not reduced. Alliance membership is charged
at $1 per head sold. According to the marketing coordinator, prices received by
alliance members are generally higher than the average state market price (i.e., one
sale reportedly resulted in a price per head of $68 over the state average market price
for steers). Membership permits producers to qualify for a preferred financing plan,
allowing the purchase of inputs needed during the preconditioning period for 60
days with no interest or payments.
Calf Marketing Alliance #3 (Calf C)
The Calf C alliance was formed in 1994, with 21 cow-calf producers. The alliance
is involved in calf production, followed by 45-day preconditioning. It was formed
to help producers raise quality animals that would command higher prices. The
alliance receives marketing assistance from the owner of a local stockyard, hence-
forth called “auctioneer,” who is in charge of truck loading and transportation, and
serves as a guarantor of checks written by buyers for alliance cattle. As shown in
figure 1, producers horizontally coordinate to pool cattle. During 2003, the alliance208   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
implemented voluntary use of electronic ear tags through a state-sponsored program,
facilitating carcass information being obtained from slaughter plants for a $2 flat fee
per head.
Most producers have switched to Angus bulls, so almost every lot sold by the
alliance in 2003 was at least 80% black. The alliance allows cattle that are less than
1/8 Brahman. An alliance coordinator handles day-to-day alliance decision making
and is in contact with all stakeholders.
The Calf C alliance is self-funded by a marketing fee of $1.25/head. Using funds
raised from marketing fees, the alliance has purchased office supplies and a set of
portable scales for producers. Extension personnel with one of the state’s land grant
universities provide extension educational support. For an individual to join the
alliance, he or she must follow the health program; produce quality, uniform calves;
have at least 20 head; be BQA certified; and meet committee approval.
In August 1994, the alliance held its first Thursday night sale, where 21 producers
sold 1,200 calves. The calves reportedly averaged higher prices than the average
conventional auction price. Since then, the marketing method has been used
annually. It entails a conference call with multiple private lines, with the auctioneer
describing the health program and terms. Within 30 minutes, generally about 2,000
calves are sold. The internet is used for exposure with relatively low advertising
costs. Sales are made one lot (truckload) at a time, with each producer constituting
a lot. One month prior to sale, sale positions are randomly drawn. Buyers purchase
directly from producers.
At time of sale, trucks are weighed on certified scales, cattle are loaded, and
trucks are reweighed. A 2% pencil shrink (expected percentage weight loss from
measured animal weight at time of sale, due to en-route shrinkage) is then deducted
from the gross weight. Average weight per head is compared to a previously agreed-
upon sale weight. If cattle are on a slide (an agreed-upon method for adjusting price
per hundredweight if cattle weigh more at delivery than agreed upon at sale), price
is adjusted accordingly. Payment is made to the auctioneer. A commission of 1.5%
is subtracted, yielding net receipts to producers. A per head marketing fee of $1.25
is assessed. The buyer pays the transportation cost.
Except for some primary cattle health requirements, producers make their own
production decisions. Some specific production requirements include the following.
Calves must be treated by the recommendations on any product following BQA
requirements. A set breeding season is required for calves to be eligible for sale in
August. All medical and deworming treatments must be recorded. Calves must be
weaned 45 days prior to sale. The producer must be BQA-certified, and must have
completed the state’s Master Cattleman program (a formal training program on
sustainable cattle production, management, marketing, stewardship, and health,
generally offered through state extension services).
Alliance members reportedly benefit primarily due to the low shrink incurred,
generally receiving higher prices than non-alliance producers for similar quality
animals due to buyer confidence in quality and consistency. Members hold meetings
on an as-needed basis and communicate by letters, e-mail, and telephone. AllianceGillespie et al. Strategic Alliances in U.S. Beef Production   209
members travel together to purchase bulls, with the objective of purchasing similar
genetics. The alliance has requested bids from pharmaceutical companies to obtain
lower prices, due to purchasing in bulk.
Natural/Implant-Free Alliance (Natural)
The Natural alliance was formed with a packing plant, two feedlots, and 150 cow-
calf producers. The ranches that supply calves to Natural are located in 17 states. All
animals are fed in one of the two feedlots, both within 70 miles of the packing plant.
The alliance was formed out of a family ranch, as there was a perceived need to
improve ranch production practices to increase beef quality consistency.
The packing plant was built in 1986, its association with feedlots began in the
early 1990s, and cow-calf producers began retaining ownership of cattle in 1996.
The main benefit of the alliance to cow-calf producers is that cattle are priced on a
grid (a method of applying premiums and discounts on carcasses based upon carcass
traits), allowing them higher prices for greater quality. Grid data for each animal
help farmers in making management decisions. Figure 1 shows the vertical integra-
tion of the cow-calf producer through the feedlot phase via retained ownership
(where the cow-calf producer continues to own calves through the feedlot stage until
slaughter), and the vertical integration of the feedlot with the packer. Because the
Natural alliance produces a branded, natural beef product, it directly reacts to
primary consumer demand.
Producers transport their own animals to the feedlot and to the slaughter plant, as
most are able to fill truckloads of cattle. However, the association has worked with
producers to arrange transportation so they could ship cattle together. As a retained
ownership program, producers incur all costs until slaughter.
Certain production requirements must be met by producers. Cattle must never
have been implanted, never have been exposed to antibiotics, and go through a VAC
45 program (i.e., Value-Added Calf and weaned for at least 45 days). Since natural
beef is sold, all vaccines and medicine applied must be recorded and the records
provided. Records also account for management practices, genetics, and weaning
weights. The alliance encourages members to utilize optimal nutrition, and advo-
cates no more than a 60-day calving season.
The  Natural alliance has worked with producers in educational programs,
providing carcass information and advice on genetics. Cow-calf producer members
meet at least once per year. In 2003, the alliance conducted regional meetings with
members. Alliance producers are encouraged to visit the plant when their cattle are
slaughtered, and to check and discuss the data. Four to five newsletters are sent to
members each year, along with extensive verbal advising. Information on individual
animals, with animals ranked from top to bottom, is also sent electronically to
members. The Natural alliance does not charge members for data, nor is there any
fee applied to producers for placing animals in the program.210   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
Commercial Beef Carcass Alliance #1 (Carcass A)
The Carcass A alliance was established in 1998 as an agreement with a packer. The
alliance involves 140 feedlots in 10 states, approximately 1,300 to 1,400 commercial
cow-calf producers from 25 states, and three packing plants. The alliance links cattle
feeding, stocker production, cow-calf production, and beef packing (as shown in
figure 1). The administrator’s main objective is to obtain the best quality cattle to fill
packer demands, and to negotiate higher prices for alliance cattle. A total of 100,000
head of fat cattle were handled by the alliance in 2002.
An exclusive grid is used for Carcass A alliance animals, designed for high-
quality cattle. The grid is considered capable of transferring incentives to producers
to produce high-quality cattle, as the locked formula sends signals on how cattle
perform on specific traits. The grid was established as part of a contract between the
administrator and packer, to furnish a previously agreed upon number of head of
quality cattle a year. The alliance was able to establish its own grid since it guaran-
teed high-quality cattle in large volumes to the plants.
Some alliance cow-calf producers retain ownership of animals to slaughter and
obtain all carcass data free of charge. Alternatively, feedlots purchase calves, carry
them until slaughter, and may provide the data to the cow-calf producers for a per
head fee of $3 to $9, depending upon slaughter plant and completeness of data
requested. The alliance also obtains cattle through order buyers via video or conven-
tional auctions. The main objective is to guarantee higher quality animals to the
packer; if these animals can be procured through conventional markets, then some
will be purchased in this manner. Alliance members benefit from grid access and the
receipt of carcass data. The feedlots attract the major packer buyers, so they are able
to negotiate and receive higher prices.
The alliance administrator sends out three letters per year to producers explaining
program performance and addressing other alliance issues. The administrator and an
office employee who handles all carcass data are the only employees. Members pay
alliance fees of $3 per slaughter animal.
Producers have reportedly received higher prices (in the range of $30 to $50 per
animal) for animals since joining the alliance, as the grid has helped them to improve
management practices and animal quality. Opportunities to market specific breeds
through Carcass A began with the Angus breed because of greater assurance of
higher marbling. Brangus and Charolais breeds are also marketed. Production and
management practices are handled individually by producers. No inputs are procured
by the alliance, nor is any labor force formally shared among members.
Producers must complete a form for each animal to be sold, including information
on vaccinations, implants, and any other medicine administered to the animal. Feed-
lots provide information on cost and weight gains of animals. The alliance collects
as much information as possible on the cattle.
Commission fees at conventional auctions or to order buyers are avoided. Trucking
costs are incurred by producers, though the alliance coordinates trucking among
producers so they can ship together, lowering transportation costs.Gillespie et al. Strategic Alliances in U.S. Beef Production   211
Commercial Beef Carcass Alliance #2 (Carcass B)
The Carcass B alliance is a division of a multinational agricultural business firm,
formed with feedlots and cow-calf producers. It allows cattle producers to participate
in the beef value creation process without retaining ownership. The Carcass B alli-
ance operates four feedlots, feeding a total of about 60,000 head annually, and
coordinates with cow-calf producers. Cattle are purchased from about 225 producers
in 16 states. Its 2000 formation was for the purpose of improving the quality of cattle
in its feedlots and product quality at the processing plant.
The Carcass B alliance began by improving personnel skills needed by buyers for
procuring cattle, and realized it needed to go the next step by providing feedback to
cow-calf producers. A program was structured to keep detailed information on
carcass quality, and to transfer feeding and packing plant performance data to cow-
calf producers. The system encourages alliance members to improve the cattle they
send to the feedlot. The alliance employs about 20 people, including buyers (field-
men) and administrators. The buyers, located throughout the United States, deal
directly with cow-calf producers. Others involved in the alliance include a meat
scientist and cattle feeding specialists. The vertical integration of cattle buyers, feed-
lots, and packer is illustrated in figure 1, as well as the vertical coordination with
cow-calf producers.
A primary benefit to cow-calf producers is the receipt of data on their cattle. At
purchase, Carcass B enters an agreement with the producer that establishes how the
cattle will be evaluated. The main mode of communication between the alliance and
its members is through the buyers. The alliance publishes newsletters and meets with
groups of producers annually. Producers are encouraged to visit the feedlots, allow-
ing them to compare their cattle with others. Packing plant trips are arranged for
producers to observe their cattle being graded. For every cattle closeout at the
feedlots, there is a one-hour conference call between the buyer, producer, and the
coordinator. They interpret the data, informing producers of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the cattle, and provide benchmark comparisons to the rest of the cattle.
Most management decision making is left to producers, though the alliance advises
and recommends management practices and provides guidelines on breeding. The
number of cattle sold must fit the established pen size: 120, requiring a minimum
cow herd size of approximately 300 head to supply two pens of one-sex uniform
calves. Thus, most alliance members ship over 300 calves annually, while the
remainder ship as commingled groups from multiple smaller producers. All weaned
calves follow a VAC 45 program or an alternative preconditioning (VAC 34)
program. Cattle may be within the following parameters: $50% British, #50%
Continental, and #3/16 Brahman. Producers must follow BQA guidelines. Detailed
records must be kept, and feedlots must know what has been applied to cattle upon
purchase. The Carcass B alliance dedicates considerable effort to communication
with producers to establish clear verification of management practices.
The alliance pays on the actual value that has been created; producers who create
more value receive higher prices. First, cattle are purchased at live market prices.212   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
Then, premiums are paid on the top-performing one-third of cattle upon slaughter.
Since these cattle have created more value than average based on feeding and
harvest performance, a percentage of the additional revenues is allocated back to the
producer. The total added value associated with better performance is shared at 40%,
30%, and 20% with producers for the top 10%, 20%, and 33% of cattle, respectively.
The Carcass B alliance participates in branding programs, but is not focused on
one brand. There are different product lines for cattle, depending upon their charac-
teristics, targeted to mainstream High Select/Low Choice retail programs or Premium
Choice programs.
With group data, members receive feeding and harvest worksheets showing actual
performance relative to an estimate made when the cattle were bought. Character-
istics measured in the plant relate to quality grade, cutability, and fallouts. There is
no charge to producers for group data, though there is a charge of $2.50 per head
sold for individual data. Transportation to the feedlot is furnished by Carcass B.
Producers pay no commission or membership fees.
Comparing and Contrasting Strategic Alliance Structures
The six strategic alliances are compared and contrasted below according to the
following criteria: transaction costs, information flow, risk, capital availability, avail-
ability of alternative market outlets, and organizational structure.
Transaction Costs
For each alliance, some transaction costs were reduced relative to the independent,
conventional auction model. The word “some” is used here because all possible
transaction costs associated with cattle marketing have not been considered, nor
have they been quantified. Some of the transaction costs dealing specifically with
information are discussed in the “Information Flow Among and Within Segments”
section to follow.
Commission fees were reduced or eliminated in all alliances except for Calf B.
For the other four through which calves were sold, either or both of a flat per animal
fee or a reduced commission was charged, the total being less than the commission
fees typically charged by conventional auctions. Shrinkage, insurance, feed, and
other transaction costs associated with conventional auctions would normally also
be reduced by using these alternative markets (Gillespie, Basarir, and Schupp, 2004).
Monitoring has traditionally been a relatively minor (small) transaction cost in the
cattle industry. As processors increase their demands for animals of specific types,
increased monitoring will continue to emerge to ensure quality and consistency.
With the commercial beef carcass alliances, monitoring is conducted primarily via
record keeping and communication, and grid pricing offers incentives for producers
to provide animals with the desired attributes. With Calf A, extensive monitoring
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Members enforce management practices to achieve standards, preventing free-riding.
With Calf B, field staff and local stores verify through record keeping that require-
ments are met. Beef Quality Assurance certification is one method used to assure
compliance by Carcass B, Calf B, and Calf C. The Calf C administrator knows each
producer personally and regularly visits their operations. Thus, he is able to identify
and address questions or concerns that may arise. Insufficient data exist to analyze
differences in monitoring costs via alliances. In fact, these costs may be greater for
alliance producers who are producing more uniform, differentiated products than for
producers who are marketing a commodity. However, the most appropriate compari-
son of these costs would be between independent producers marketing a differentiated
calf versus the alliance producer marketing the same calf.
Transportation costs are transaction costs if they are specific to a market. Most
of the alliances surveyed reported lower producer transportation costs for their
producers. While Natural, Calf B, and Carcass A producers pay some transportation
costs after the calf is weaned, these alliances have worked with producers to arrange
transportation so they could ship together, and thus reduce costs. Calf A and Calf C
buyers incur transportation costs. Carcass B pays for calf transportation. Hence,
transportation costs incurred by producers were eliminated or had the potential to be
reduced in all alliances.
All three of the calf marketing alliances purchase some inputs in bulk, allowing
members to secure them at discounted prices. Though the associated reduction in
input price is not a reduction in a transaction cost per se, the lower cost is the result
of alliances among firms.
Information Flow Among and Within Segments
Collection of product and price data that inform the producer about relative prices
to be expected for particular animal types requires significant time investment. The
commercial beef carcass and natural/implant-free alliances provide information to
members primarily via grid data. Specific grid data fees (the fees for obtaining
carcass data from the packers) are not charged to Carcass B or Natural members.
For Carcass A, data are provided at lower cost compared to non-alliance producers.
Each of these alliances meets with producers to discuss data and advise man-
agement. Each also publishes a newsletter. The Natural alliance arranges for
producer visits to the processing plant. Information flow in these alliances tends to
be more vertical (among up- and downstream segments) in nature, primarily from
packer to cow-calf producer. Calf C members also have access to carcass data for
a fee.
Some vertical communication also occurs in the calf marketing alliances. For Calf
B, a publication is issued by the supply cooperative transferring information on
alliance performance, information regarding alliance members, and cattle industry
news. Additionally, there is personal communication with field staff personnel at the
retail stores. Calf B has considerable information flow due to the many institutions
participating in the alliance.214   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
Calf A uses primarily communication channels among members. This alliance
appears to have the highest level of horizontal (within-segment) communication.
Calf C members also meet regularly and communicate by letters, e-mail, and
telephone. Alliance meetings are held with animal health institutions and university
faculty to address management issues.
For calf marketing relative to the commercial beef carcass alliances, the infor-
mation flow is generally more horizontal—among cow-calf producers. There is
typically less (or in some cases, no) feedback on how cattle perform after they leave
these alliance programs. Learning about consumer tastes and preferences occurs,
instead, through relationships among producers and formal educational programs
that inform on innovations, standards, and industry issues.
Risk
A number of studies have addressed risk concerns with livestock grid pricing (e.g.,
Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner, 1995; Anderson and Zeuli, 2001). Schroeder and Kovanda
(2003) examined the role of risk in strategic alliances. The present study, however,
provides little evidence of price variability being significantly reduced through
beef strategic alliances. While producers reportedly received higher calf prices, no
pricing formulae were designed specifically for the purpose of reducing price
variability. Likewise, there were no specific mechanisms to reduce production
variability.
Despite this study’s limitation in detecting changes in price or production varia-
bility, several risk factors need to be addressed. First, Anderson and Zeuli’s (2001)
findings suggest that grid pricing increases price variability relative to average
pricing, which would imply greater price risk among the alliances pricing via grid:
Natural and Carcass A and B. Second, some markets used by alliances, such as
video auction and private-treaty sales, may reduce price variability, as discussed by
Lesser (1993), and Gillespie, Basarir, and Schupp (2004). These markets are, how-
ever, open to all producers of considerable size whether or not they are involved in
alliances.
Third, retained ownership, which is utilized by the Natural alliance, shifts produc-
tion risk, such as the risk of death loss or poor performance in the feedlot, to the
cow-calf producer. Fourth, many of the production practices required or encouraged
by the alliances generally reduce production variability. Vaccinations, for instance,
may be viewed as insurance. As shown by Avent, Ward, and Lalman (2004), it is
unclear whether preconditioning increases profit, as it generally increases both
revenue and cost; the price premium can be viewed, however, as a risk premium paid
by feeders to insure against death loss. Thus, while risk was not formally and
specifically addressed by the alliances, risk faced by cow-calf producers would
likely be impacted through alternative marketing and the required use of risk-
reducing management practices.Gillespie et al. Strategic Alliances in U.S. Beef Production   215
Capital Availability to Producers
Calf B provides short-term no-interest loans to producers via a preferred loan
program. Though the other alliances do not have specific mechanisms to improve
capital access, some may lead to input cost reduction. Calf A and Calf C purchase
inputs in bulk, effectively reducing average variable cost. Commercial beef carcass
alliances did not appear to increase capital access among members.
Availability of Alternative Market Outlets for Animals 
of Specific Traits
An advantage of strategic alliances cited by alliance administrators is that members
receive premium prices for animals of specific traits. While this study has not com-
pared actual pricing among the alliances, each alliance has requirements it claims
have led to greater returns. Each is concerned with breeding. The Angus breed and
its crosses are the most desired among the interviewed alliances. For Natural,
premiums are paid for Angus-bred animals, and opportunities to market specific
breeds with Carcass A began with the Angus breed. Carcass B accepts cattle falling
within specific breed parameters. Calf A advertises black breeds as the highest
percentage. Calf B has been more successful in selling Angus, Charolais, and Red
crosses, as these have commanded higher prices. Based on market indicators, Calf
C members are encouraged to use Angus animals. Limited Brahman influence is
allowed in most of the alliances.
In addition to genetic traits, specific production practices are required for cattle
in most of the alliances. Specific vaccination and preconditioning programs are
utilized by most of the alliances. Beef Quality Assurance guidelines are followed by
at least three of the alliances. Some of the alliances purchase bulls together in order
to increase calf consistency.
Alliances have utilized different markets for animals. Calf A and Calf C have
depended primarily on private-treaty sales, with the latter also utilizing the internet.
Calf B depends primarily upon conventional auction sales, but attracts major buyers
due to volume and animal quality. The two commercial beef carcass alliances
employ private-treaty purchasing. Natural is a retained ownership program. These
results provide evidence that successful strategic alliances can be formed around a
number of different marketing/procurement strategies.
Organizational Structure
For each of the alliances, involvement in the cow-calf phase began within the past
12 years. Thus, the types of strategic alliances covered in this study are relatively
new to the industry. No employees are hired specifically to manage most of the
alliances. The two commercial beef carcass alliances are the only alliances that pay
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Of the six alliances, Carcass A manages the largest quantity of cattle, accounting
for 100,000 head a year by contract and working with 1,300 to 1,400 commercial
cow-calf producers. The alliance is involved in cow-calf production, stocker
production, feeding, and packing. In contrast, Carcass B operates with 60,000 head
and approximately 225 producers. Calf B has managed approximately 13,000 calves
in 2¼ years of operation, while Calf C managed 1,975 head in 2003. This number
is relatively small compared to the commercial beef carcass alliances. The smallest
alliance, Calf A, has managed approximately 2,500 head in its five years of opera-
tion. Thus, there is a wide range of size among alliances. Size impacts the scope of
an alliance, both in phases of production and geographic influence. The larger
alliances obtain cattle from multiple regions of the United States, while smaller
alliances are focused on pooling cattle over smaller regions to market truckloads of
calves.
A comparison of flow charts for each of the alliances (figure 1) reveals major
differences in coordination. The calf marketing alliances are focused on cow-calf
production with smaller quantities of cattle, partially due to their location in the cow-
calf producing Southeastern United States. They emphasize horizontal coordination
in producing large volumes of consistent quality calves for sale at premium prices.
These alliances differ considerably from their commercial beef carcass counterparts,
which have greater involvement with downstream segments. The natural/implant-
free alliance is, perhaps, the most extensively coordinated, with a differentiated,
branded product being produced.
Conclusions and Discussion
Based on the findings of this study, strategic alliances have served to reduce some
transaction costs involved in the production and marketing of beef products. Specific
transaction costs that may be reduced include information, negotiation, and trans-
portation costs. This cost reduction, in combination with the main impetus of
establishment of alliances—i.e., to obtain higher prices for cattle—should lead to
greater profit for the cow-calf producer relative to the non-alliance producer pro-
ducing a similar calf. Though no data were collected on prices received by alliance
members, administrators commented that prices received by alliance producers were
higher than for most non-alliance producers. These higher prices resulted primarily
from the ability to assemble larger truckloads of consistent and higher quality cattle
of specific traits. Obtaining carcass information was also advantageous for producers
in some of the alliances, providing feedback allowing them to reconsider
management practices to increase returns, and perhaps even be able to obtain quality
premiums.
The selected governance structures appear to be consistent with those that would
be expected according to criteria set forth by Williamson (1979). None of the
structures are vertically integrated to the cow-calf producer, but are governed either
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relatively small cow-calf producers, transactions are generally infrequent, and great
idiosyncratic investments are not made, leading to market governance (Calf A,
Calf B, and Calf C). Relational contracts are with producers with more idiosyncratic
investments due to greater scale, more frequent transactions, or specific management
requirements, such as with Natural. Few contracts with cow-calf producers in this
industry, however, are likely to be of the nature of those in the hog and poultry
industries, as discussed by Gillespie et al. (2000).
Strong evidence did not emerge to conclude that price variability to cow-calf
producers is reduced via beef strategic alliances, though it is expected that grid
pricing would impact price risk. While some of the markets used by alliances, such
as video auction and private-treaty sales, may reduce price variability, these markets
are open to all larger producers, regardless of their involvement in alliances. Access
to these markets would be an advantage of alliances for smaller producers. Likewise,
beef strategic alliances are not generally set up to provide cow-calf producers with
greater access to capital. Except for one alliance, none of the interviewed alliance
representatives specifically addressed access to capital. Decisions of the alliances to
not extensively address capital access and risk could be due partially to the relatively
lower initial capital investment in buildings and equipment for cow-calf production,
as opposed to its competitor industries. As noted by Gillespie et al. (2000), asset speci-
ficity is not as great in cow-calf production as in broiler or hog production. There may
be less demand among cow-calf producers than with other livestock enterprises for
alliances that provide capital acquisition mechanisms and risk reduction.
Findings allow for the conclusion that additional advantages of alliances to cattle
producers are: (a) the increased flow of information along the supply chain via a
variety of different mechanisms, each of which is designed to reduce the transaction
costs associated with obtaining information, and (b) alternative market outlets for
animals of specific traits, or the reduction of transaction costs associated with
searching for markets that accept animals with specific traits. Thus, alliance
producers have greater access to data helpful to them in making profit-maximizing
decisions, and they can access the markets through which their animals command
the highest prices.
Each of the interviewed alliances is relatively new to the cow-calf segment; none
were involved in this segment 12 years ago. Discussions with administrators suggest
that, in cases where a strategic alliance is run primarily by its members, formation
and operation often involve trial and error until members are comfortable with a
strategy. Such alliances are likely to evolve as new strategies become available.
Strategic alliance administrators reported their organizations had evolved signifi-
cantly early in their establishment. Alliances must be sufficiently flexible and open
to change as needed.
Administrators indicate the success achieved by their strategic alliances has been
due in large part to the production of quality animals based on sets of established,
detailed requirements. All but one of the alliances specified a set of management
practices to be used by cow-calf producers. All provided producers with incentives
to produce quality cattle.218   Fall 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
Producers who would not want to join an alliance include those who (a) are in the
cattle business primarily as a hobby and are uninterested in devoting significant
management to improving their operations, (b) strongly value their autonomy and
would resent other producers or members of other segments of the production chain
enforcing alliance production standards, (c) are unwilling to abide by group market-
ing decisions, or (d) are concerned only with reducing risk or accessing capital for
their operations. For those who are interested in forming a strategic alliance, the six
alliances considered here provide a diversity of examples of models that could be
used in constructing an alliance designed to meet the needs of a particular group of
producers.
Some discussion was presented at the beginning of the paper dealing with mech-
anisms through which the beef industry is changing to meet consumer tastes and
preferences. It is our opinion that the alliances which link more downstream
segments with the cow-calf segment (i.e., Natural, Carcass A, and Carcass B) are
those with the greatest potential for effectively responding to changing consumer
tastes and preferences. Their vertical structures are specifically set up to transfer
consumer preferences throughout the system to the cow-calf producer, mainly via
grid pricing. This is not meant to suggest calf marketing alliances are not achieving
or cannot achieve the same end. All three of the calf marketing alliances are striving
to produce calves that command the highest prices by larger buyers—presumably
the buyers whose interest extends beyond simply filling a truck to capacity. It is
important, however, for the industry to create mechanisms whereby the correct
signals can be sent through the entire system to ensure the calves that command the
highest prices lead to the meat cuts most demanded by consumers. Otherwise, the
success of alliances in improving the final consumer product will be limited.
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